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Abstract 
 
Turkey experienced a financial crisis in 2000-2001 which led to 
significant financial reforms.  The reforms resulted in a switch to a floating 
exchange rate, granted greater central bank independence and pursuit of a more 
credible monetary policy.  Investigation of the channels of monetary policy in 
both periods finds that monetary policy’s output effects have been strengthened 
considerable by the reforms.  In the pre-crisis period monetary policy was highly 
inflationary, while in the post-crisis period, monetary policy targets low inflation 
and has become a tool for output stabilization.   These results support the 
importance of central bank independence and a credible policy. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Turkey has historically suffered a number of economic problems.  Inflation was 
high and persistent.  Dollarization, the use of foreign currency, was widespread.  The 
central bank lacked credibility.  The banking sector was an oligopoly and domestic 
financial markets were shallow and volatile.  These many problems culminated in a 
financial crisis in 2001. 
This crisis provided the impetus for a number of economic reforms.  Central bank 
independence was increased.  An authoritative and independent Monetary Policy 
Committee was created concomitant with the increased role given to monetary policy.  
The fixed exchange rate was abandoned and monetary policy adopted an inflation target. 
These reforms were followed by a dramatic drop in the inflation rate.  The 
average inflation rate during the late 1990s ranged from 60-90 %.  After the 2001 reforms 
inflation dropped to single digit levels.  Output fluctuations were also stabilized.  
Maintaining this hard-earned stability became the focus of economic policy. 
Lucas (1976) established that a change of the policy regime may change behavior 
within an economy.  Barro and Gordon (1983) emphasize that a regime change will solve   4 
the time consistency problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977).  Alesina and Summers 
(1993) demonstrate that central independence results in less inflationary monetary policy.   
Analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) in Turkey may provide 
insight into the effects of the policy reforms.  If the policy reforms are credible, then in 
the post-crisis period monetary policy will have a larger effect on output than previously, 
since monetary policy was highly inflationary prior to the crisis.  Thus, analysis of the 
channels of monetary transmission will demonstrate whether the reforms have 
successfully enhanced the effectiveness of monetary policy as a stabilization tool. 
While the literature on the MTM is extensive, almost all empirical analyses focus 
on industrialized countries.  There are a limited number of studies of Turkey’s MTM, but 
none investigates the possibility of changes in the MTM due to the post-crisis financial 
reforms.  Previous studies only investigate a subset of the potential channels of monetary 
policy.  This paper contributes to understanding of the MTM in Turkey by thoroughly 
examining all potential channels of monetary policy, and investigating whether the 
reforms have changed the MTM in Turkey. 
The next section of this paper reviews the general literature on the MTM.  The 
following section summarizes the salient features of the crisis and subsequent reform in 
Turkey and studies of the MTM in Turkey.  The fourth section presents estimates of a 
baseline model of monetary transmission in Turkey.  The fifth section examines the 
channels of monetary transmission.  The final section concludes the paper. 
2.  Review of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism Literature   5 
Monetary policy affects the real economy and inflation by changing either a 
monetary aggregate or an interest rate target.  In either case, the policy change works 
through a number of potential channels to affect output and inflation.  The traditional 
channels of monetary policy include changes in real interest rates, changes of exchange 
rates, and changes in asset prices.  Recent research has also focused on the impact of 
monetary policy on credit, both through changes in bank lending and changes in 
borrowers’ balance sheets. 
The interest rate channel is the primary MTM in traditional models of monetary 
policy.  Central bank actions that change nominal, short-term interest rates also change 
real interest rates along the yield curve if prices are sticky.  Changes in real interest rates 
primarily affect investment expenditure, and to a lesser extend consumption expenditure. 
  The basic mechanism of the interest rate channel remains unchanged in recently 
developed theories based on rational expectations and forward-looking expectations. 
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1998).  Recent research 
expands the theory to include new variables into the model such as consumers’ decisions 
on housing and durable expenditures, and substitution effects in consumption spending 
(Els, Locarno, Morgan and Viletelle 2003; Taylor, 1995). 
  The interest rate channel may be weak in developing countries where financial 
markets are shallow and the state owns most of the banks. In such countries, limits on 
interest rates are binding, and state-owned banks have limited incentive to lend based on 
commercial criteria (Horvath and Maino, 2006).   6 
The work of Fleming (1962), Mundell (1963), and Dornbusch (1976) on the 
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition brought attention to the exchange rate as a 
channel of monetary policy.  Under the UIP condition, the difference between domestic 
and foreign interest rates equals the expected change in the exchange rate.  The change in 
the exchange rate affects the domestic economy via both aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply.  
On the demand side, a monetary tightening that increases domestic real interest 
rates results in a real appreciation of the domestic currency making domestically 
produced goods more expensive than foreign produced goods, decreasing net exports and 
reducing domestic output. (Obsfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Taylor, 1993). On the supply side, 
a real appreciation of the domestic currency decreases the domestic price of imported 
goods, which decreases domestic inflation via the exchange rate pass through effect 
(McCallum and Nelson, 2001).  The level of pass through to the local currency price of 
imported goods and, hence, to the overall inflation rate depends on the import share, the 
magnitude of the appreciation and its timing, and the macroeconomic characteristics of 
the economy (Alper 2003; Campa and Goldberg 2004; Kara, Tuger, Ozlale, Tuger, 
Yavuz and Yucel, 2005). Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2003) argue that countries with 
a low volatility of money growth experience low rates of exchange rate pass through 
whereas countries with highly volatile money growth have higher pass through.  
The type of exchange rate regime influences the effectiveness of the exchange 
rate channel as a transmission mechanism. With a flexible exchange rate regime, the 
exchange rate channel works through aggregate demand and supply as discussed above.   7 
But if the exchange rate is fixed, the ability of the monetary authority in a small country 
to affect real output via the exchange rate channel is limited because the domestic interest 
rate is determined by the world interest rate. However, if domestic and foreign assets are 
imperfect substitutes, possibly due to capital controls, domestic interest rates may deviate 
from international levels and monetary authorities may have some room to maneuver (De 
la Rocha, 1998; Kamin, Turner and Van’t dack, 1998). Moreover, research on emerging 
countries finds that the exchange rate channel is still a very important transmission 
channel for small open economies (Taylor, 1999). 
Monetary policy affects asset prices such as bonds, equity shares, and real estate, 
changing firms’ stock market values and household wealth. Changes in stock market 
values and household wealth in turn affect aggregate demand. Tobin’s (1969) Q-theory of 
investment and Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) life-cycle theory of consumption are two 
famous views of the asset price channel in the MTM. 
Tobin’s Q (1969) is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the 
replacement cost of capital owned by that firm. Following a monetary tightening, equity 
prices fall, decreasing Q.  A lower Q makes investment more costly for the firm, reducing 
investment and aggregate output (Ireland, 2005).  
In Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) life-cycle theory of consumption, a policy-
induced interest rate increase reduces the value of a household’s long-term assets.  This 
decrease in financial wealth leads to decreased consumption expenditure and a fall in 
output.   8 
Meltzer (1995) asserts a wider impact of monetary policy through asset prices.  
He contends that the short term nominal interest rate is not the only mechanism affected 
directly by monetary policies. Monetary policy actions affect the markets for durable 
goods, real estate, equities, and financial assets along with interest rates. Changes in all of 
these asset prices affect aggregate demand and output. 
However, the impact of the asset price channel in emerging markets is more 
unpredictable compared to industrialized countries (Kamin et al., 1998).  Asset markets 
are shallower and less competitive in emerging markets, and macroeconomic 
performance can be more volatile resulting in greater uncertainty.  These factors may 
reduce the effect of asset prices as a MTM in emerging countries.  
The interest rate channel implicitly assumes that financial markets are competitive 
and work so efficiently that interaction between monetary policy and the real sector can 
be reduced to interactions between interest rates and real variables (Ozturkler, 2002). Yet, 
all financial markets suffer asymmetric information problems, especially for medium and 
small borrowers for whom information is costly to obtain.  In emerging economies 
financial markets are often so poorly developed that the quantity of the credit, as well as 
its price, becomes an important instrument of monetary policy (Kamin et al., 1998).  
Benanke and Gertler (1995) define the credit channel of monetary policy not as an 
independent alternative to the traditional monetary transmission channels, but as an 
“enhancement mechanism” amplifying and transmitting interest rate effects.   They 
identify two channels through which central bank policy influences credit markets: the 
bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel.    9 
The bank lending channel focuses on the effects of policy-induced actions on the 
supply of bank credit. Theories and models of the bank lending channel emphasize that if 
some of the borrowers are bank dependent (i.e. they do not have other forms of external 
financing) and bank loans are imperfect substitutes for other assets, monetary policy may 
operate through a bank lending channel. A monetary tightening decreases the supply of 
bank reserves reducing bank lending especially for banks that are dependent on deposits. 
Then, bank-dependent firms are forced to cut back their investment spending.  The 
reduction in output following a monetary tightening results from financial market 
imperfections (Ireland, 2005).  
The strength of the bank lending channel depends on size of the lending 
contraction for a given monetary policy shock
1 (Bean, Larsen and Nikolov, 2002), as well 
as on balance sheet conditions (Gibson, 1997).  The empirical evidence about the lending 
channel is ambiguous, with reports of both a strong and a weak channel.  Kamin et al. 
(1998) find that the bank lending channel is weaker in emerging economies than in 
industrialized economies due to limited competitiveness and limited flexibility of 
financial markets. In contrast, the evidence for Korea, an emerging country, indicates that 
the bank lending channel remains significant (Bank of Korea, 1998). Edwards and 
Mishkin (1995) argue that the bank lending channel has been weakening in industrialized 
economies due to banks’ diminishing role in credit markets resulting from financial 
innovations and to an increasingly competitive environment in the banking sector in the 
recent decades.    10 
The balance sheet channel, also known as the “financial accelerator” or “broad 
(credit) channel”, focuses on “the potential impact of changes in monetary policy on 
borrowers’ balance sheets and income statements, including variables such as borrowers’ 
net worth, cash flow and liquid assets” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995: 29).  Interest rate 
increases reduce asset values, adversely affecting borrowers’ balance sheets and 
creditworthiness.  A change in the net worth of the borrower affects the borrower’s 
ability to obtain loans for investment and consumption.  A reduction of net worth not 
only increases adverse selection, but also moral hazard, since borrowers with low net 
worth have an incentive to take greater risks.  The balance sheet channel affects both 
firms’ investments and households’ consumption expenditures.  
3.  Crisis and Monetary Reform in Turkey 
From the 1970s through the 1990 Turkey suffered chronic and rising inflation.  
Monetary policy changed frequently and by the 1990s Turkish monetary policy targeted 
the real exchange rate.  The nominal rate was depreciated in line with inflation to keep 
the real rate constant and maintain the competitiveness of Turkish exports.  However, the 
policy was not transparent.  The frequent policy changes, lack of transparency of the 
exchange rate policy and an associated scandal hurt the credibility of the Turkish central 
bank.
2  
In November 2000 Turkey experienced rapid financial outflows due to a loss of 
investor confidence.  Restrictions on capital flows had been removed in 1990, but the 
underdeveloped financial system remained vulnerable to speculative attacks. The capital 
outflow created a domestic banking crisis and a large budget deficit, resulting in rapid   11 
monetary growth and currency devaluation.  Unable to maintain an exchange rate target, 
the currency was floated.    
Following the crisis, policies were adopted to restructure and reform the Turkish 
economy.  In addition to floating the exchange rate, institutional reforms aimed to 
increase the role of markets, restructure state banks, reduce the public sector burden on 
the economy, grant independence to the Central Bank and transition monetary policy 
toward an inflation targeting regime (Yilmaz, 2006).  The transition to inflation targeting 
began in 2002 and was completed in 2006.  An additional goal of the reforms was to 
more closely harmonize the Turkish economy with European Union standards. 
The 2001 reforms may have affected the monetary transmission mechanism in 
Turkey in a number of ways.  Prior to the reforms, entrepreneurs’ incentives were to 
secure state contracts and monopoly positions.  Increased transparency since the reforms 
reduces the scope for corruption and rent seeking, subjecting firms more to market forces 
(Airado, Dervis, Gros, Ozatay, Bayar and Isik, 2004). Increased credibility and 
predictability provide a stable environment attracting more foreign direct investment.  
Basci, Ozel and Sarikaya (2007) report that the increased capital inflows into Turkey 
have had a substantial effect on Turkish monetary policy and the monetary transmission 
channels.  For example, the asset price channel has been stronger in post-2001 period 
than in the pre-2001 period.  
Switching to a floating exchange rate regime has diminished exchange-rate-pass-
through to prices, and weakened the dominance of dollarization. This change has also 
enhanced the effectiveness of monetary policy (Ozatay, 2005). In addition, given that   12 
Turkey is a small open economy, switching to the floating exchange rate regime is 
expected to change the monetary transmission mechanism by strengthening the interest 
rate and credit channels and weakening exchange rate pass-through to prices (Basci et al., 
2007). This expectation is supported by theory that suggests that the floating exchange 
rate regime provides more discretion and flexibility for the state to focus monetary policy 
on domestic issues such as shocks to the domestic economy (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003).  
As part of the 2001 reforms the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) gained instrument 
independence so that it is isolated from political decisions. Also, the new law requires 
that the CBT cut off credits to public institutions including the Treasury (Yilmaz, 2006). 
The reforms move the CBT’s short term interest rate to the forefront by redefining its 
primary role for shaping expectations; such a policy strengthens the interest rate channel 
in the monetary transmission mechanism (Basci et al., 2007). 
State banks were restructured during the process of structural reform.  Redundant 
state banks, their branches and employees were eliminated; capital adequacy ratios were 
increased; and a new Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Institute was created to 
monitor all the banks in Turkey (Ozatay, 2005).  Similarly, all other state institutions 
have undergone a process of reformation in line with EU standards.  These reforms 
include elimination of redundant positions and branches, redesign of the agricultural 
support system, setting new hiring limits for state agencies; and public sector budgetary 
discipline and increased accountability.  New laws have reformed the regulation and 
supervision of private enterprise, seeking to increase competition and efficiency.   13 
In the first five years following the reforms real growth has averaged over 7% and 
inflation has fallen to single digit levels.  Public and external debts have both declined 
substantially.  Airado et al. (2004, 1) note that “the assessment of both private market 
actors as well as of international institutions is that the program has been successful in re-
establishing macroeconomic stability, reducing the debt ratio and laying the ground for a 
durable acceleration of growth in an environment of drastically reduced inflation and 
much lower real interest rates.”  
The task of preserving of sustained growth and low inflation rests primarily with 
monetary policy.  Thus, it is important to understand the MTM link between monetary 
policy actions and both the real economy and inflation. However, the existing empirical 
literature examining the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey fails to explore the 
possibility of a structural break in 2001. Moreover, existing empirical studies report 
several contradictory findings. For example, one study (Sahinbeyoglu, 2001) finds that 
the interest rate channel is weak while another study (Ozturkler, 2002) using data 
covering almost the same period finds that the interest rate channel is one of the two 
strongest channels.
3  Other recent studies demonstrate that the interest rate channel is 
strong.
4  
Empirical studies examining the exchange rate channel also report contradictory 
findings (Ozturkler, 2002). While some empirical studies (Aslan and Korap
5, 2007; 
Sahinbeyoglu, 2001) note that the exchange rate channel dominates the Turkish monetary 
transmission mechanism, one study (Basci et al., 2007) reports that the importance of 
exchange rate channel has been attenuated in the post-2001 period due to the inflation   14 
targeting regime combined with a floating exchange rate regime, and the disinflation 
policies in the post-crisis period which have enhanced the effectiveness of monetary 
policy.  
(Aslan et al., 2007) provide evidence of a strong asset price channel in 
combination with the exchange rate channel.  Several studies (Aydin, 2007; Basci et al., 
2007) conducted by the Turkish Central Bank demonstrate the importance of the credit 
channel (i.e. bank lending channel) in the post crisis period.
6  Alternatively, Ozturkler’s 
(2002) study of the pre-crisis period finds that the bank lending channel is weak.  
In sum, the limited literature examining the monetary transmission mechanism in 
Turkey reports inconsistent findings.  A structural break following the 2001 reforms is a 
possible reason for the disparate findings.  
Empirical studies examining the MTM before and after crisis periods in emerging 
economies similar to Turkey find that post-crisis reforms have changed the MTM in these 
economies.  These studies examine the MTM in Mexico (Sidoui and Ramos-Francia, 
2008), Chile (Betancour, De Gregorio and Medina, 2008), and Argentina (Gomez-
Gonzalez and Grosz, 2007).  
4.  Monetary Transmission in Turkey – A Baseline Model 
Sims (1980) developed the Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework, which he 
first used for the analysis of monetary policy.  Since his seminal work, numerous studies 
have used the VAR methodology to analyze the monetary transmission mechanism 
(Bernanke, 1986; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Boivin and Giannoni, 2002; Bernanke and 
Mihov, 1998; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996; 1999; Mojon and Peersman,   15 
2003; Peersman and Smets, 2003).  Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and 
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1998) review the MTM literature for the United States.  Their 
methodological discussions demonstrate that VAR is an appropriate method for the 
analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey. 




i t Y C Y e + F + = -
= ￿
1
                            (1) 
In Equation (1), Yt denotes a vector of endogenous variables, C denotes a vector of 
constants, Fi denotes the matrices of autoregressive coefficients, Yt-i   denotes a vector of 
lags of the endogenous variables and et is a vector of white noise processes; the error 
terms are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with zero mean and constant variance with 
a variance-covariance matrix E(et et’)= Se . The constants and the autoregressive 
coefficients (i.e. C and F1, F2…., Fp,) are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for 
each part of Equation (1) separately. The sample covariance matrix of the OLS residuals 
is used to estimate Se. 
The data
7 used in the baseline estimate are the domestic nominal short term 
interest rate (interbank money market rate denoted as INTRATE), the log of the Consumer 
Price Index (LCPI),  the log of Industrial Production Index (LINDPROD), and the log of 
a monetary aggregate (LM1).
8  Thus the Y vector of the baseline VAR is 
Y= [INTRATE, LM1, LCPI, LINDPROD]       (2) 
The sample consists of monthly observations from 1996:07 through 2007:06.  
Due to the structural break in 2001, the data series are divided into two sub-samples and   16 
the model is estimated separately for each sub-sample.
9  The pre-crisis sub-sample 
includes 52 observations for the period 1996:7 - 2000:10. The post-crisis sub-sample 
includes 75 observations for the period 2001:04 -2007:06.  The 5-month crisis period is 
excluded.  The two sub-sample periods also separate the different exchange rate regimes: 
a fixed exchange rate regime for the pre-crisis period and a floating exchange rate regime 
for the post-crisis period.  
Sims (1980) suggests ordering the variables from the most pervasive to the least 
pervasive, so that variables contemporaneously affecting the other variables are ordered 
first, and the variables with less or no contemporaneous effect on the others are ordered 
last.  Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the policy 
variable is ordered as the first variable in the model. They point out that for high 
frequency data such as monthly or biweekly data, the policy variable should be ordered 
first implying that policy makers know only lagged values of the non-policy variables.  
The underlying assumption is that policy shocks have a contemporaneous impact on all 
of the endogenous variables, while the endogenous variables have no contemporaneous 
impact on the policy variable. The price measure (LCPI) is ordered before the real output 
measure (LINDPROD) due to rapid price adjustment that typically occurs in high 
inflation countries (Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988).
10  
Tests find unit roots in all variables except LM1 in the first sub-sample and unit 
roots for all variables in the second sub-sample.
11  Johansen’s cointegration test is 
performed for the variables which are integrated of order 1 in each subsample. The   17 
results show that there exists cointegrating relationships between the variables that are 
I(1) in each of the sub-samples.  
  When a cointegrating relationship between the variables exists, the literature 
suggests using both a Vector Error Correction model and a VAR in levels.  This study 
uses a VAR in levels for several reasons. For models with non-stationary and 
cointegrated variables, the parameters and the impulse responses of a VAR in levels are 
estimated consistently (Hamilton, 1994, Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990).   Secondly, 
estimating a VAR in levels facilitates interpretation of the results relative to more 
complicated (i.e. Vector Error Correction) models. A third reason for estimating VARs in 
levels is that the cointegrating vectors for both periods (not reported) indicate inconsistent 
behavior of oputput.  Specifically, output increases following a positive interest rate 
innovation. Fourth, since most empirical studies estimate a VAR in levels, comparison 
with the existing literature is straightforward. Finally, since the data samples cover short 
periods, the MTM is analyzed as a short-term phenomenon, similar to other relevant 
empirical studies (Peersman and Smeets, 2001; Favero 2001; Al-Mashad and Billmeier, 
2007).  
The VAR model in levels is estimated for the ordering INTRATE, LM1, LCPI 
and LINDPROD. The Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criteria determines the optimal lag 
length as two periods for the pre-crisis period, and one lag for the post-crisis period. 
The impulse response functions of the baseline model for the pre-crisis and post- 
crisis periods illustrate the findings.  Monetary policy is analyzed through a one-time   18 
positive shock to the policy variable (INTRATE by one unit (1 percentage-point, i.e. 100 
basis points).  The results for the pre- and post- crisis periods are displayed in Figure 1.
12   
Since a positive innovation to the interest rate is a contractionary monetary policy 
shock, the impulse response patterns shown in the Figure 1 are consistent with the 
empirical evidence for the USA, the Euro Area, and many other countries (Christiano, et 
al., 1999; Gerlach and Smets, 1995; Peersman et al., 2001).
13  An unexpected temporary 
increase in the interest rate causes negative deviations of output from its long run value in 
both periods.  An unexpected one unit shock (1% increase) to the interest rate decreases 
output about 0.2% in pre-crisis period while this decrease is about 0.6 % in the post-crisis 
period.  The reaction of output to policy shocks is more persistent and faster in the post-
crisis period. The magnitude of the effect of 1 % interest rate shock on output seems 
small in both periods.  However, a one unit (1% or 100 basis point) shock is small 
relative to a one 1 standard deviation shock. 
As shown in Figure 1, the price level (LCPI) responds positively to interest rate 
innovations in the pre-crisis period.  This result, known as the “price puzzle”, is 
consistent with the empirical literature on the MTM in the US and in many other 
countries.  One explanation of the price puzzle is that an unexpected increase in the 
interest rate increases inflationary expectations thereby increasing the price level. 
(Morsink and Bayoumi, 2001). A second explanation for the price puzzle for emerging 
economies such as Turkey is the existence of a “cost channel” of monetary transmission 
(Barth and Ramey, 2000; Ozturkler, 2002; Sjuib, 2003). An increase in the interest rate 
increases firms’ borrowing costs resulting in an increased price level, especially “if the   19 
firms depend on short term borrowing for their working capital needs” (Ozturkler 2002).  
While the “price puzzle” is strong in the pre-crisis” period, it weakens considerably and 
is much smaller in the post-crisis period.  This result is consistent with increased 
credibility of monetary policy and reduced inflationary expectations. 
The effect of an interest rate shock on the monetary aggregate variable (M1) is 
negative as expected. The effect is smaller (0.4 % when it bottoms out) and more 
sluggish in the pre-crisis period.  It is larger (0.8% when peaks) and negative during the 
fifty month period after a shock in the post-crisis period, suggesting a stronger 
relationship between monetary policy and the money market.  
Variance decompositions are computed for each variable at forecast horizons of 
one to three years. The results indicate that after three years in the pre-crisis period, 
interest rate shocks account for around 20 % of the fluctuations in output, with own 
shocks accounting for most of the rest (75%). In the post-crisis period, monetary factors 
(both interest rate and M1 shocks) account for almost 45% of the variance of the forecast 
error in output after three years. 
5.  The Channels of Monetary Policy in Turkey 
Analysis of the effectiveness of each monetary transmission channel (i.e. interest 
rate, exchange rate, asset price, and credit channels) in Turkey is conducted using the 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework.  Each of the four channel variables is added to 
the baseline model in turn both endogenously and exogenously.  Adding each channel 
variable one at a time as an endogenous variable, the extended baseline model (i.e. the 
endogenous model) is specified as follows




i t Y C Y e + F + = -
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                          (3) 
where Yt denotes the vector of  endogenous variables, C denotes a vector of constants, Fi 
denotes the matrices of autoregressive coefficients, Yt-i   denotes the vector of lags of the 
endogenous variables  and et is a vector of white noise processes. More specifically; 
Y= [INTRATE, LM1, CHANNEL, LCPI, LINDPROD]   (4) 
where the variable CHANNEL denotes one of the monetary transmission channel 
variables (i.e. exchange rate, asset price, credit and interest rate channels). The 
endogenous variables are ordered based on economic theory as in the Y vector above.
  The next step is to estimate another model where the channel variable is added to 
the baseline model as an exogenous variable. The model is as follows: 
      t t i t
p
i
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= ￿
1
                        (5)      
where Yt denotes the vector of endogenous variables, C denotes a vector of constants, Fi 
denotes the matrices of autoregressive coefficients, Yt-i   denotes the vector of lags of the 
endogenous variables, Xt denotes the exogenous variable which is one of the monetary 
transmission channel variables  and et is a vector of white noise processes.  
To estimate the effectiveness of each channel, the relevant variable is added to the 
baseline model as an endogenous variable, and Equation (3) is estimated. The impulse 
responses of the baseline model and the endogenous model are compared. Then the 
exogenous VAR model is estimated (Equation 5). The impulse response functions of this 
model are compared with the former model in terms of the size of the responses to a 
policy shock (Alwani 2006; Kuttner and Mosser 2002; Morsink and Bayoumi, 2001;   21 
Poddar, Sab and Khachatryan, 2006). This method is applied to each of the four 
transmission channels one at a time by changing the relevant variable representing that 
channel to assess the impact and size of each channel.
15 
Exchange Rate Channel 
To measure the strength of the exchange rate channel in Turkey, the variable, 
LEXCRATE, which is the log of the average nominal monthly exchange rate between the 
Turkish Lira and US Dollar, is added to the baseline model.
16 The models (baseline, 
endogenous, exogenous) are estimated with lag lengths of two periods for the pre-crisis 
sample and one period for the post crisis sample. 
Figure 2 shows impulse responses of output (Industrial Production) after a one 
unit interest rate innovation using the baseline, endogenous and exogenous exchange rate 
models for both periods.  The impulse responses for the pre-crisis period (Figure 2A) 
suggest that the exchange rate channel worked exogenously.  The impulse responses for 
the baseline and endogenous models are almost the same.  The output response is larger 
(a greater fall in output) for the exogenous model.
17 
  The impulse response for the post-crisis period (Figure 2B) shows a stronger 
endogenous channel and supply side effects dominating demand side effects.
18  The 
demand side effect is the reduction of output from higher interest rates.  The supply side 
effect is the exchange rate appreciation that reduces import prices; the exchange-rate pass 
through effect (McCallum and Nelson, 2001) that leads to an increase in output. This 
result indicates that output still depends substantially on imports in Turkey, especially 
imports of energy used in industrial production. Overall, the results indicate a strong   22 
exchange rate channel in the post-crisis period, consistent with the literature (Disyatat 
and Vongsinsirikul, 2003).  Of course, the switch to a floating exchange rate should 
increase the strength of this channel.  
  For the impulse responses for prices (not show), adding the exchange rate channel 
does not eliminate the price puzzle in the pre-crisis period, but does eliminate it in the 
post-crisis period.  The response of prices to an increase (depreciation) of the exchange 
rate is stronger in the pre-crisis period.  The relationship between the nominal exchange 
rate and other nominal magnitudes is stronger for fixed exchange rates than for floating 
rates. 
Asset Price Channel 
 Asset prices are measured by the log of the monthly average of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange price index (LISEINDEX) with the base year set to 1986, as in Alwani (2006), 
and Poddar et al. (2006).
19  The model specification is the same as the previous estimate. 
The impulse responses (Figure 3) for both periods display only minor differences 
between the baseline model and the models including an asset price channel.  However, 
the variance decompositions of output for the endogenous asset price channel model 
reveal that asset price shocks make an important contribution to the variability of output 
in both periods.  At a three-year horizon, asset price shocks account for around 23 % and 
interest rate shocks account for 13 % of the fluctuations in output, with own shocks 
accounting for 58 % in the pre-crisis period. In the post-crisis period, movements of asset 
prices account for 27 % of the variation of output, whereas interest rates account for 12 %   23 
and own shocks of output account for 48 %.  Thus, these results indicate that the asset 
price channel is working in the both periods.
20 
Adding asset prices to the model (results not shown) obtains the result of a price 
puzzle in both periods, whereas there was no price puzzle in the post-crisis period for the 
baseline model.  However, the magnitude of the price increase is smaller when asset 
prices are included in the pre-crisis period models. 
Credit Channel 
Credit is measured by the log of the outstanding amount of total banking system 
loans (LLOAN), a la Disyatat et al. (2003) and Alwani (2006).
21  Specifications are the 
same as for previous estimates.     
As seen in Figure 4 for the pre-crisis period, in the short run, output responds very 
quickly in the endogenous and exogenous models relative to baseline model, but the 
medium and long-run responses of output are similar in both the endogenous and baseline 
models.  This channel does not appear to be very effective in the medium and long run. 
The credit channel is weak in the pre-crisis period. 
In the post-crisis period, the initial effect of the policy shock on output is the same 
for both the baseline and endogenous credit channel models.  Output decreases sharply in 
the first month and then begins to stabilize. Although the initial short run effect of the 
shock on output is the same in both models, the medium and long run effects are 
different. For the endogenous model, output stabilizes slowly relative to the baseline 
model. The response of output to interest rate shocks is somewhat larger than the baseline   24 
model in long run, suggesting that part of the interest rate shock in the endogenous model 
reflects bank lending shocks.  
The impulse responses of output for both the endogenous and exogenous models 
indicate the existence of a stronger credit channel in the post-crisis period. The behavior 
of output in the endogenous model is different than that of the exogenous model in the 
long run.  These results suggest that the credit channel is stronger in the post-crisis period 
relative to the pre-crisis period, as expected.
22  The reforms following the crisis 
strengthened credit markets (Basci et al., 2007). 
Adding bank loans to the model endogenously or exogenously does not solve the 
price puzzle in the pre-crisis period (results not shown), but it decreases the inflationary 
effect on prices quite a bit.  In the post crisis period, adding bank loans to the model 
endogenously further decrease prices. In the exogenous model, prices increase more 
relative to baseline model after an interest rate innovation. 
Interest Rate Channel 
Estimating the effectiveness of the interest rate channel in MTM is slightly 
different from the estimation of the effectiveness of the other channels because the 
baseline model already includes the central bank interest rate.  Adding another interest 
rate variable to the baseline model may not accurately reflect the effect of interest rates 
on the economy. Thus, based on the empirical literature, two different approaches are 
used to examine the effectiveness of the interest rate channel.  
The first approach adds a real bank lending rate to the baseline model as in 
Poddar et al. (2006), and Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007), and proceeding as above with   25 
the other channels.  The second approach assumes that the central bank’s interest rate in 
the baseline model captures the effect of the interest rate (Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul, 
2003; Alwani, 2006).  Including the other three channel variables endogenously captures 
the effect of all four channels.  Then, the effect of the interest rate is isolated by “holding 
constant” the other three channels simultaneously (Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul, 2003).  
This is done by estimating the baseline model with the three other channel variables 
added exogenously.  When these three channel variables are exogenous, the output effect 
of interest rate changes is isolated.  
  Data for bank lending rates could not be obtained, so they are proxied by bank 
deposit rates, which do vary with bank loan interest rates.  The interest rate variable is a 
weighted average of one-month deposit rates.
23 Deposit interest rates are weighted by the 
volume of deposits and the number of days to maturity. One-month deposit rates provide 
better information about the reaction of financial markets after an unexpected monetary 
policy shock, but are collinear with the Central Bank’s money market rate.  Therefore, 
three-month deposit rates are also used in alternative estimates of the interest rate 
channel. 
  The estimated results (not shown) obtain a very weak effect for deposit interest 
rates for both periods.  However, the price puzzle disappears in both periods when the 
deposit interest rate variable is included in the model as an exogenous variable.  Variance 
decompositions indicate that the deposit interest rate explains almost none of the 
variation in output.  Overall, this approach finds very little support for a strong interest 
rate channel.   26 
The second approach to estimating the interest rate channel includes all channel 
variables as endogenous variables in the model.  The Y vector is: 
Y= [INTRATE, LM1, LEXCRATE, LLOAN, LISEINDEX, LCPI, LINDPROD]       (6) 
In this model the central bank’s interest rate reflects the interest rate channel. Then, 
another VAR is estimated with the three other channel measures (i.e. exchange rate, 
credit, and asset price channels) treated as exogenous variables.  Holding constant the 
three exogenous variables, the output effects of a policy shock represent the interest rate 
channel. 
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses of output following a 1 % interest rate 
innovation for both the endogenous and exogenous models in both periods.  The 
endogenous model includes all channels and the exogenous model shows the effects of 
the interest rate channel.  The impulse response of output to a one unit (100 basis point) 
interest rate innovation in the endogenous model in the pre-crisis period (left panel in 
Figure 5) reveals that output decreases sharply for the first two months and then abruptly 
increases in the following months.  Output begins to stabilize after twenty four months.  
In the exogenous model the initial fall in output (almost 0.11 % in two months) is 
very close to the response of output when all the channels are include in the model in the 
pre-crisis period. In this model output stabilizes quickly in twenty months. These results 
indicate the existence of an interest rate channel in the pre-crisis period.  
In the post crisis period (right panel of the Figure 5) an interest rate innovation 
decreases output sharply in both models. The decrease is about 0.35 % in the endogenous   27 
model. Then output increases above its initial level. The effect of the policy innovation 
on the output stabilizes slowly.  
For the exogenous model a 1% interest rate innovation decreases output by 0.55% 
in the first month and output remains negative throughout the estimation period. This 
decrease of output for the exogenous model is larger than the decrease in output for the 
endogenous model.  Also, the effect of the interest rate channel on output is larger in the 
post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period (an initial decrease of 0.55% compared to 
0.11%). Also, the effect in the post crisis period is more persistent.  This evidence 
indicates the existence of a stronger interest rate channel in the post-crisis period.  
This result is consistent with the policy change of the Central Bank of Turkey in 
the post crisis period. The Turkish Central Bank began targeting interest rates as a policy 
tool in the second period, so the interest rate channel is expected to be stronger in this 
period. 
  For the impulse responses for prices (not show), holding constant the channels 
except for interest rates (i.e. the exogenous model) does not eliminate the price puzzle in 
the pre-crisis period,  but it decreases the inflationary effect on prices. Furthermore, the 
price increase stabilizes sooner relative to the endogenous model. In the post crisis 
period, there is no evident price puzzle for the endogenous model. Prices decrease 
initially for six months in the exogenous model, too. Overall, in the post crisis period the 
interest rate channel eliminates price puzzle. 
In sum, these results provide further evidence in support of central bank 
independence and the choice of policy regime.  The post-crisis policy reforms in Turkey   28 
have increased the effectiveness of monetary policy.  In the pre-crisis period, the 
inflationary policy resulted in relatively weak channels of monetary policy on real output.  
In the post-crisis period, the policy reforms appear to have considerable strengthened 
monetary policy. 
6.  Conclusion 
  Turkey adopted a number of structural reforms following its 2000-2001 financial 
crisis.  Key features of these reforms are a change in the conduct of monetary policy and 
greater central bank independence.  This study investigates the impact of these reforms 
on the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey.  The results demonstrate that the 
monetary transmission mechanism gains strength following the structural break in 2001.  
Estimates of a baseline model indicate that an unanticipated increase in interest 
rates affects aggregate economic activity both before and following the crisis in the 
expected way. However, the impact of an unexpected interest rate shock is larger, faster 
and more persistent in the post-crisis period.  A policy shock increases prices in the pre-
crisis period.  This result, known as the “price puzzle”, is widely found in empirical 
studies for many other countries. The price puzzle for the emerging countries such as 
Turkey may also be due to a “cost channel” of monetary transmission.  Increases in 
interest rates increase costs for firms that depend on short term borrowing for working 
capital needs.  Firms pass on these cost increases in their prices. In other words, the 
existence of the persistent price puzzle in the pre-crisis period suggests that firms adjust 
their prices rather than output in response to interest rate shocks.   29 
Exchange rates are an important channel of monetary transmission both before 
and after the crisis.  The strength of the exchange rate channel has increased following 
the crisis and the switch to a floating exchange rate, while exchange rate pass through 
decreased at the same time.
24  Policy shocks affect output more quickly and stabilize 
more quickly in the post-crisis period when exchange rates are added to the model.  
The asset price channel is weak in both periods. The responses of output and asset prices 
to interest rate shocks are not intuitive in the pre-crisis period, as output and asset prices 
increase after a policy shock.  In the post-crisis period the results are as expected.  
The credit channel is found to be weak and working only in the short run in the 
pre-crisis period. Although the short data span after the structural reforms limits the 
analysis, the effect of the credit channel appears to have increased the post-crisis period. 
It was expected that improved operation of credit markets would strengthen the credit 
channel following the reforms, a result that is confirmed by the empirical results (Basci et 
al., 2007).  
Two approaches are used to test the strength of the interest rate channel.  The first 
approach includes an additional interest rate variable in the model. The impact of the 
additional interest rate variable is weak, but somewhat stronger in the post crisis period.  
The second approach assumes that the effect of the interest rate channel is the effect of 
the policy interest rate when holding constant the effects of the other channel variables.  
This methodology finds a much stronger interest rate channel, and the strength increased 
considerably following the monetary reforms.   30 
The results strongly support the importance of central bank independence and a 
credible monetary policy.  The policy reforms following the financial crisis granted the 
central bank greater independence and allowed the pursuit of a credible monetary policy 
using a short-term interest rate.  The reforms have increased the ability of the central 
bank to stabilize output, since the effects of monetary policy on output, especially interest 
rates and exchange rates, have strengthened considerably since the reforms.  Whereas 
monetary policy affected prices more in the pre-crisis period, now policy has strong and 
persistent effects on real output.  Turkey’s policy reforms appear to have been successful, 
making monetary policy more credible and a more effective stabilization tool. 
   31 
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Figure 1- Selected Impulse Responses of the Baseline VAR 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions of Output for Asset Price Models 
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions of Output for Endogenous (All channels) Model 
and Exogenous (Interest rate channel) Model for pre and post-crisis periods  34 
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1 This contraction is directly proportional to the interest elasticity of the demand for money. In the case of 
elastic money demand, policy shocks lead to more variation in loans. Furthermore, the effect of the lending 
contraction on the real economy is directly proportional to the size of the pool of bank dependent borrowers 
(Bean et al., 2002). 
2 The exchange rate was not publicized, but it was known in advance by high level bureaucrats who sold 
that information to currency traders including bank owners. The currency traders bought the currency from 
the central bank when it was cheap, and sold it back when it was expensive. 
3 Sahinbeyoglu (2001) examines the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey for the period 1987 to 
1999 in the context of a small aggregate macroeconomic model. She concludes that the monetary 
transmission mechanism is weak when the fiscal and monetary polices are uncoordinated. 
Ozturkler (2002) examines the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey for the period 1986 
through 2001 using a Vector Autoregression framework. He finds that interest rate channel is strong, and 
the bank lending channel is weak in Turkey. 
4 Basci, Ozel and Sarikaya (2007) summarize Turkey’s monetary transmission mechanism for the last 
decade based on studies conducted by the central bank’s staff.  They report that the interest rate and credit 
channels have strengthened, while the exchange rate channel has weakened in the recent years.  
Cifter and Ozun (2007) use a vector error correction model based causality test to analyze the data 
from 1997 through 2006. They find that the interest rate channel is relatively stronger in Turkey.  This 
study does not investigate the possibility of a structural break in 2001. 
5 Aslan and Korap (2007) analyze the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey for the 1992-2004 
period using Vector Autoregressions, while ignoring the possibility of a structural break.  
6 Aydin (2007) uses a VAR to examine the data from 2001 to 2005. 
7 The data are from the International Financial Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund. 
8 Historically money developments have played an important role in Turkish monetary policy strategies. 
9 Fung (2002), Hesse (2007), and Patrawimolpon, Rattanalankar, Charumilind and Ngamchant (2001) 
conducted their analyses using the sub-sample data:  pre- crisis and post-crisis. 
10  The Likelihood Ratio Test is used to test whether the error covariance matrix is diagonal for the baseline 
model for both pre and post crisis periods. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the error 
covariance matrix is diagonal at the 5 % level of significance for both periods. If the error covariance 
matrix is diagonal, which is the case for the baseline model, the estimated impulse response functions are 
not sensitive to the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VAR model. 
11 Both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-GLS test based on the 
Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criteria are used to test for unit roots.   The five percent level of 
significance is used for all tests.  
12 Since the VAR in levels includes nonstationary variables, the confidence intervals with impulse 
responses would be incorrect. Confidence intervals are not reported with the impulse responses in these 
graphs.  
13  In Figure 1 the horizontal axis denotes the number of months elapsed after the shock, and the vertical 
axis denotes the deviation from the baseline level of the target variable in response to a one time unit shock 
to the policy variable (INTRATE). 
14 Another method of analysis would be to include all four channel variables simultaneously, but data 
limitations preclude this approach. 
15 The likelihood ratio test is used to assess the robustness of the results.  The null hypothesis of an 
exogenous channel is tested against the alternative hypothesis of an endogenous channel.  If the null is not 
rejected, the null of no effect of a channel (the baseline model) is tested against the alternative of a non-
zero effect. 
16 Data are from the International Financial Statistics database. 
17 Likelihood ratio tests indicate an exogenous exchange rate channel in the pre-crisis period and an 
endogenous channel in the post-crisis period. 
18 Basci et al. (2007) also find that the supply side effect is dominant. 
19 The data are from the Central Bank of Turkey. 
20 Likelihood ratio tests indicate the asset price channel works exogenously in both periods. 
21 Data are from the Central Bank of Turkey.   41 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Likelihood ratio tests support the existence of an exogenous credit channel in the pre-crisis period and an 
endogenous channel following the crisis. 
23 Deposit rate data are from the Central Bank of Turkey. 
24 Ca’Zorzi, Hahn and Shanchez, 2007; Kara et al., 2005; Leigh and Rossi, 2002 all find that pass through 
decreases with the adoption of floating exchange rates.  
 